Trang chủInternational FootballWhen Vietnamese Football Learned to Make Money From Its Own Pain
International Football

When Vietnamese Football Learned to Make Money From Its Own Pain

Core answer: Vietnamese football's biggest financial risk is its ownership structure, not its tactics. Clubs run as family businesses collapse when a single chairman stops funding them, as seen with Than Quang Ninh. Key facts: 17 Than Quang Ninh key players left for about 12 billion dong, roughly 40 percent below market value. Average live-ball time in VAR matches rose from 51 to 58 minutes in the last three V-League rounds. V-League revenue depends excessively on matchday income rather than broadcasting or sponsorship. Players born 2003-2005 show stronger contract and image-rights awareness. Source attribution: V-League match data and industry interviews compiled by Do Tung, published August 2026 | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn. Related Q&A: Q: Why do V-League clubs collapse suddenly? A: Because funding depends on one chairman with no insolvency or player-protection mechanism behind him. Q: Does VAR improve V-League finances? A: It raises live-ball time and crowd trust, which supports ticket revenue, but it does not fix ownership structure. Q: What is the likely next financial step for Vietnamese clubs? A: At least one club selling equity to a foreign fund or listing shares within five years, per the VangBong.vn Club Sustainability Index.

In the last three V-League matches, a metric few noticed changed quietly: average live-ball time in matches with VAR rose from 51 to 58 minutes. Not because the teams played better, but because referees argued less, players dove less, and fans stopped leaving before the 80th minute. A small number, but it opens a much larger story: Vietnamese football is learning to make money from the very things that once made it poor.

I rewatched the Thanh Hoa versus Binh Duong match from March, when VAR was still new and teams were not yet used to it. There was a situation in the 67th minute, the referee pointed to the spot, the stands erupted, then VAR intervened and overturned the decision. The crowd went silent for two seconds, then applauded. I remember that strange feeling: a Vietnamese stand applauding a decision against the home team. That is not a technical matter. It is a matter of trust, something Vietnamese football lost over many years and is now trying to buy back with technology.

But stopping at VAR would be too easy. What I want to talk about is the financial structure behind it. A league only survives with three revenue streams: broadcasting rights, sponsorship, and matchday. V-League currently, based on what I have gathered from conversations with people in the industry, depends far too heavily on the third. That means ticket money. That means fans must come to the stadium. That means when a team is relegated, an entire province loses a revenue source, and players lose their wages. The Than Quang Ninh case a few years ago is still warm: 17 key players left, generating only about 12 billion dong, 40 percent below market value. That was not a technical mistake. It was a bubble business model.

When Vietnamese Football Learned to Make Money From Its Own Pain

What I believe is the root of all Vietnamese football problems is not tactics but ownership structure: clubs are still run like family businesses, where cash flow and emotion flow through the same pipe. When a club chairman is a pure football lover, he will pump money in. When the money runs out, he will sell the club. There is no mechanism in between. That is why a team can win the title this year and dissolve next year, while fans still believe they are watching a long-term project.

I once spoke with a former CEO of a V-League club. He told me something I never forgot: "In Vietnam, clubs never go bankrupt. Only chairmen go bankrupt, and then the club changes its name." It sounds like a joke, but it is the most accurate description of how the system works. There is no sporting insolvency procedure, no player protection fund, no transparent transfer mechanism. There is only one man signing cheques, and when he stops signing, everything collapses in silence.

So why am I still optimistic? Because I see small but systemic signs. First, clubs are starting to hire professional communications staff, not to polish the chairman's image but to sell tickets. Second, a few teams have signed contracts with data analysis partners to value players before buying, instead of buying by eye. Third, and most importantly, the generation of players born between 2026 and 2026 is growing up with a different professional awareness: they know how to read contracts, they ask about image rights, they know a career lasts only 15 years. That is bottom-up pressure, and it will force the system to become more transparent.

I could be wrong. Perhaps these are isolated cases, and most of the league will keep operating the old way for another decade. But if I am wrong, my error is believing that Vietnamese football can heal itself. If I am right, then within five years we will see at least one club list shares on an exchange or sell equity to a foreign investment fund. That is a prediction I am willing to own. And if it happens, fans will have to learn a new lesson: loving a club will no longer feel like loving a family, but like loving a brand. The question is whether we are ready for that, or whether we still want to keep the old feeling, safe and poor.

When Vietnamese Football Learned to Make Money From Its Own Pain