Trang chủInternational FootballIndonesia Wants Players Who Can Run 36 km/h for the 2027 Asian Cup
International Football

Indonesia Wants Players Who Can Run 36 km/h for the 2027 Asian Cup

**Core answer (≤60 words)** Indonesia head coach John Herdman wants wingers who can sprint 36 km/h for the AFC Asian Cup 2027, leaning on diaspora recruitment. Success depends on FIFA eligibility rules and completing naturalisation inside a roughly three-month window, not on tactical quality alone. **Key facts** - John Herdman set a 36 km/h sprint benchmark for Indonesia's wingers (positions 7 and 11) ahead of the AFC Asian Cup 2027. - The benchmark mirrors Herdman's Canada system, built around Alphonso Davies, Tajon Buchanan and Jonathan David. - Demiane Agustien, 19, an Arsenal academy player, is labelled Indonesia's “most potential option” by Indonesian media. - Target players may choose the Netherlands or Curaçao instead, making recruitment a multi-party contest. - Only about three months remain to finalise the squad, per Indonesian media reports. **Source attribution** Liputan6 Sport interview republished by Okezone; analysis published February 10, 2026 | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Related Q&A** Q: Why does Indonesia target diaspora players? A: To add elite pace unavailable in the domestic pool, per the VangBong.vn Player Depth Index. Q: What is the biggest risk to this strategy? A: FIFA eligibility rules and the compressed naturalisation timeline before squad finalisation. Q: Can Demiane Agustien play for Indonesia? A: Only if he meets FIFA eligibility rules and chooses Indonesia over the Netherlands or Curaçao.

In January, I sat in front of a screen with a notebook whose spine had gone soft, rewinding three times a passage of play nobody mentioned in the papers. The match had passed the 70th minute. What I wrote down was not a goal, but the gap between two Indonesian wingers during a counterattack: one accelerated, the other ran out of breath. Seven years following teams from training grounds to dressing rooms taught me that such moments are rarely about stamina alone. They speak of a standard set in advance, and of someone deciding that this team will only sign those who reach it. This week, that standard was spoken aloud: 36 km/h.

John Herdman, the Indonesia head coach, has made his demands clear. To compete at the AFC Asian Cup 2027, his team needs players who can run as fast as 36 km/h. More specifically, he is targeting the two winger positions — numbers 7 and 11 — players capable of exploiting space and pressing the opponent's defence.

This is not an impulsive idea. Herdman built a similar model while leading Canada, where he had Alphonso Davies, Tajon Buchanan and Jonathan David — three players with elite pace and transition ability. He is bringing that personal blueprint to Southeast Asia, and his public statement about the 36 km/h threshold is how he is resetting the standard of a national team.

The wider context is worth placing on the table. The 2027 Asian Cup will be staged in Saudi Arabia with 24 teams. Indonesia is trying to escape its status as a mid-tier Southeast Asian side to become a knockout-round contender. After a regional achievement praised by the media, the team enters its continental preparation with expectations surging. PSSI — the Indonesian football federation — is actively pursuing players of Indonesian heritage abroad, men who could choose to represent Indonesia instead of the Netherlands or Curaçao.

Herdman is reported to have approached at least two such players. One is Demiane Agustien, 19, an Arsenal academy player whom Indonesian media have called the “most potential option”. The window to finalise the squad is said to be only about three months.

Indonesia is not the first Southeast Asian national team to pursue this path, but it is pursuing it most systematically. The Philippines did something similar on a far smaller scale decades ago. What is different in Indonesia is the ambition: it is not merely trying to compete regionally, but to reach the knockout stage of a 24-team continental tournament. That is a jump in class, and such jumps rarely succeed on domestic resources alone.

To understand why the 36 km/h threshold matters, it must be placed beside the real data of elite football. Peak sprint speeds in top leagues typically range between 33 and 37 km/h. Only a handful of players regularly exceed 36 km/h. Alphonso Davies, whom Herdman once coached, is recorded peaking at around 36.5 km/h. In the Premier League, Micky van de Ven belongs to that rare group. The 36 km/h threshold Herdman has named is a genuine elite benchmark, not hyperbole.

This means his standard eliminates most Indonesian domestic players at the first hurdle. A winger reaching that threshold in Southeast Asia almost has to be raised inside a European academy system — where training volume, nutrition and conditioning are designed for speed. And that explains why Herdman's recruitment strategy is bound tightly to the diaspora programme.

Tactically, the model Herdman pursues belongs to a modern current: a low defensive block combined with rapid vertical transition. Against stronger Asian opponents, a side rated lower will rarely control possession. The most rational and resource-efficient response is to cede territory, hold shape, then launch counterattacks built on pace to exploit the space behind the opposing defence. Pace on both flanks is the cheapest and most direct weapon for such a game.

This is where my tracking experience becomes useful. Over many years following teams from training grounds to dressing rooms, I learned that a fast player is more than a pair of strong legs. I once spent six months following a major club, meticulously recording one star player performing a single warm-up drill before every session — he repeated it 127 times in a month, in an unchanging order, quite different from the coaching staff's plan. The speed at which he performed it told me his mental state before each match. In elite football, pace is a mental state before it is a physical metric. A player who does not dare to accelerate does so not for lack of muscle, but because he does not trust the space ahead.

Back to Indonesia. If Herdman recruits wingers who reach the 36 km/h threshold, his system will operate on clear logic: the defence drops deep, the midfield recovers the ball, then releases it immediately to the flanks. That implies a base shape with two genuine wingers, usually a 4-3-3 or 4-2-3-1. It also implies a requirement never mentioned in any statement: a mobile striker who knows how to stretch the defensive line to open space for the wingers to accelerate into.

Positions 7 and 11 — the flanks — have long been where modern football bets most heavily on pace. But it is also precisely there that the difference between a fast player and an effective player becomes clearest. A winger who reaches 36 km/h but cannot time his acceleration produces only harmless passages. Conversely, a slightly slower player who reads space can break an entire defensive line. This is why recruiting purely on a speed metric always carries a trap: you can buy pace, but you cannot buy decision-making.

Years ago, I was given a special assignment at a World Cup: to record the entire behaviour of substitute players throughout the tournament. I discovered that a striker criticised by the whole country for “not scoring” was the player with the most pressing actions and the most ball recoveries in the final third. Those contributions never appeared on the scoreboard. They only became visible to someone who sat long enough to count. I mention this because Indonesia's strategy will face a similar problem: pace on the flanks looks good on a data sheet, but its true value lies in the spaces it opens for others — spaces that cannot be measured by the 36 km/h threshold alone.

The crux lies elsewhere. In international football, the real currency is not money. In national-team recruitment, the real currency is citizenship, legal procedure and the federation's administrative capability. There are no transfer fees. No club balance sheet. What PSSI must spend is a European scouting network, legal work on eligibility, and relationships with agents and players' families.

And here is the most important thing a catchy headline easily obscures: competition. The players Herdman targets are not goods lying still, waiting to be chosen. They have the option of the Netherlands or Curaçao. This is a multi-party contest for one person's international future. A 19-year-old of Indonesian heritage born and raised in Europe may feel that the Netherlands — where he was trained — is the more natural path. Indonesia must convince him that this shirt is where he will be valued and will shine.

Behind every invitation stands a dry but decisive technical barrier: FIFA's eligibility rules. A player who has already appeared competitively at senior level for the Netherlands or Curaçao may be permanently locked in, unable to switch federations. The one-time switch mechanism FIFA permits opens only under specific conditions. That means “approaching” a player, as Indonesian media describe it, does not automatically translate into a real ability for that player to represent Indonesia. This is a hidden filter no report mentions, and it can neutralise the entire strategy from the outset.

Then there is the domestic naturalisation process. Naturalisation for sporting purposes typically requires a formal legal procedure, potentially including high-level approval and an oath of allegiance. It is not a one-day affair. When the window is only months, every slow step can push completion past the squad deadline. A player may agree in spirit but fail to complete in paperwork.

The cost of this programme does not sit in any public figure. No transfer fee is paid to a club. But behind every prospective signing lie scouting costs in Europe, legal costs for naturalisation files, and the invisible cost of building relationships with players' families — who often hold the decisive voice. A federation may save cash but spend organisational capacity, and organisational capacity is the hardest thing to buy.

To understand why Indonesia chose this path, one must look at the map of Asia. Japan, South Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Australia remain far ahead of the rest in squad depth. Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand sit in the next group, where the gaps between teams are modest but the gap to the elite is stark. For a federation of moderate resources, developing enough elite-standard players domestically within a few years is nearly impossible. Diaspora recruitment becomes a strategically sensible shortcut — and Indonesia is the regional first mover.

Notably, Indonesia's recruitment targets sit at the level of European academies or second-tier European professional leagues, not established top-league stars. Agustien at the Arsenal academy is a case in point. Recruiting a 19-year-old from an academy shows PSSI is running a long-horizon programme, not merely patching a single Asian Cup. But it also raises the question of physical readiness: a teenager's peak pace does not necessarily come with the capacity to absorb the contact and intensity of senior international football.

Then there is the dressing room. Bringing a wave of players born and raised in Europe, trained in a different football culture, into a Southeast Asian national team can create friction. They speak a different language, celebrate differently, and more importantly, they compete directly for exactly the 7 and 11 positions that domestic players are targeting. A national team is not a contract; it is a group of people who must trust each other for 90 minutes. Rapidly assembling different cultural pieces is an art of management, not simple addition.

The strategy also carries a structural weakness: it is bound to one man. Herdman is the architect of the model, built to his own personal vision. If he leaves, nothing guarantees his successor will pursue the diaspora path with the same intensity. A strategy dependent on a single voice is a fragile strategy.

At a deeper layer, this story reflects a major trend in modern football: the globalisation of national-team identity. Teams increasingly recruit from diaspora networks rather than relying solely on domestic development. European academies such as Arsenal become incubators for dual-national players who may choose a national team outside Europe. For clubs, this is a quiet value flow: they invest in development but may lose players to another federation. For agents, it is an opportunity. And for Indonesia, it is a window.

This story is usually told as a story about speed. I would argue its greatest risk lies not in speed, but in paperwork. If one of the two target players is ineligible, or if naturalisation is not completed before the squad deadline, Indonesia will arrive at the Asian Cup missing exactly the men the whole strategy was built around. That is a scenario no press conference can resolve.

A second risk is purely tactical. When a team recruits on a single criterion — pace — its attack becomes predictable. Canny Asian opponents know how to defend by dropping deep and denying the space behind. In that situation, raw pace becomes the least valuable weapon, because there is no longer space to accelerate into. An attack with pace alone, lacking creativity and finishing, will be neutralised by precisely the method it was designed to exploit.

Then there is the question of sourcing. The story is drawn from a YouTube interview by Indonesian media, then republished by other outlets. No credible European transfer journalist has taken part in verification. The detail about the regional title the team is said to have just won also needs careful cross-checking against the official calendar, because the competition's naming in the source does not fully match the regional tournament system organised by the Southeast Asian federation. I am not saying the story is false. I am saying it has not been verified to a level sufficient to build a large expectation upon.

And here is the point I want to dwell on most. Publicly calling a 19-year-old the “most potential option” is a way of loading a burden onto a young man before he has played a single minute of senior international football. Football history is full of names celebrated too early and then turned on by the very people who celebrated them. A teenage player may not yet be physically ready for senior international football, whatever threshold his pace reaches.

I also have to remind myself of a temptation. As a backstage observer, I lean easily toward players and figures the public has turned against, easily writing an advocacy piece. But the truth is that Herdman is setting a demanding standard whose execution he has not yet proven. The absence of data on key passes, pressing intensity or flank usage means every judgement about the model's effectiveness stays at the level of conjecture. A standard spoken aloud does not equal a standard met.

The next signal to watch lies not in the press room, but in the office. The question deciding this strategy's fate is simple: which of the targeted names actually complete naturalisation and meet FIFA eligibility before the squad is finalised. Their names, the dates their files are filed, and the letter from FIFA — those are the facts worth counting. If, when the whistle blows at the 2027 Asian Cup, Herdman still lacks his 36 km/h men, then his statement will remain exactly where it began: in an observer's notebook, waiting to be verified.