Kim Sang Sik Splits His Forces Between Ninh Binh and Pleiku: The Selector Who Won't Be There
**Core answer:** Huấn luyện viên Kim Sang Sik đang phân chia lực lượng giữa đội tuyển quốc gia Việt Nam (giao hữu với Đài Bắc Trung Hoa và Kyrgyzstan tại Ninh Bình) và U23 Việt Nam (VTV Cup tại Pleiku, 10-14/11/2026). Đội tuyển quốc gia ưu tiên chuẩn bị Asian Cup 2027; U23 hướng tới vòng loại U23 châu Á 2028. **Key facts:** - Cửa sổ FIFA tháng 11/2026: đội tuyển quốc gia đá giao hữu tại Ninh Bình, U23 Việt Nam dự VTV Cup tại Pleiku từ 10 đến 14/11/2026. - VTV Cup có bốn đội: Việt Nam, Thái Lan, Singapore, Qatar; đội vô địch nhận 100.000 USD. - Vé VTV Cup có ba mức giá 200.000, 300.000 và 400.000 đồng. - Đội U23 do một huấn luyện viên khác dẫn dắt, không được nêu tên trong thông cáo VFF. - Hai trận giao hữu cấp đội tuyển quốc gia thuộc diện FIFA bắt buộc nhả quân; giải U23 thì không. **Source attribution:** Thông cáo Liên đoàn Bóng đá Việt Nam, công bố cuối tháng 10/2026 | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Related Q&A:** Q: U23 Việt Nam đá với những đội nào ở VTV Cup 2026? A: U23 Việt Nam gặp U23 Thái Lan ngày 10/11/2026, U23 Singapore ngày 12/11/2026 và U23 Qatar ngày 14/11/2026 tại Pleiku. Q: Vì sao đội hình U23 dễ biến động hơn đội tuyển quốc gia? A: FIFA chỉ bắt buộc nhả quân cho các trận cấp đội tuyển quốc gia, nên câu lạc bộ có thể giữ cầu thủ khỏi giải U23 mà không vi phạm luật. Q: Ai dẫn dắt U23 Việt Nam ở VTV Cup 2026? A: Thông cáo VFF không nêu tên; đội U23 do một huấn luyện viên khác phụ trách như các đợt tập trung trước.
On the morning of 10 November, when the referee blows for kick-off between Vietnam U23 and Thailand U23 at Pleiku, Kim Sang Sik will be standing more than a thousand kilometres away. In Ninh Binh, the senior national team will be running its final session before the friendly against Chinese Taipei. Two grounds, two whistles, one day. The Vietnam Football Federation's communiqué reads beautifully balanced: the senior side building toward the 2027 Asian Cup finals, the U23s toward the 2028 AFC U23 qualifiers, both preparing in parallel inside the same FIFA window, 10 to 14 November. But there is one detail sitting between the lines that I kept reading back. The U23 head coach is not named. Nguyen Van Phu, VFF General Secretary, is quoted six times. Kim Sang Sik is named directly, with a note that he returned and resumed work immediately the day before. The man who will actually stand at Pleiku, the first person accountable if the U23s lose to Thailand in the opener, is described in four words: "as in previous training camps." In 39 years of watching football, I have learned that the missing name is usually the most important one.
Some necessary context. The November 2026 FIFA window is the last one before the 2027 Asian Cup finals. In Ninh Binh, the senior team plays two friendlies: Chinese Taipei and Kyrgyzstan. It is a complementary pair, whether or not anyone confirms it was designed that way. Chinese Taipei typically defends in a deep, compact low block - the right opponent for rehearsing how to break a packed defence, dominate territory and work set pieces. Kyrgyzstan is a physically robust, direct, aerially strong Central Asian side - the right opponent for testing second-ball control and rest-defence against direct transitions, historically a stress point for Southeast Asian teams.
In Pleiku, the four-nation VTV Cup brings together Vietnam U23, Thailand U23, Singapore U23 and Qatar U23. A single round robin: three matches in five days. Champion's prize: USD 100,000. Three ticket tiers: 200,000, 300,000 and 400,000 dong. The top tier sits at or above the premium end of domestic football pricing - a signal of confidence in demand in Gia Lai, where football culture runs several generations deep. If attendance disappoints, the tournament's economics deteriorate faster than its sporting value.
Read closely, this is a communiqué about process, not about football. No formation, no squad list, no technical metric of any kind. Six of the fifteen information points are quotes from VFF leadership. That is not automatically a fault - a federation has the right to announce a plan before publishing the detail, and withholding squad lists until announcement day is standard practice. But it leaves one thing I cannot set aside: when two national teams prepare inside one window, what exactly is being divided, and by what principle?
Start with the most verifiable point: release obligations. Under FIFA's Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, clubs are obliged to release players for senior international "A" matches inside the international match calendar. That obligation does not automatically extend to youth friendlies. The two matches in Ninh Binh are A-matches. The three in Pleiku are a U23 invitational. The consequence is concrete: if a V.League club has an important young player carrying a minor knock, or is fighting for a title or against relegation, it can legitimately keep him at home - but cannot keep him from Ninh Binh if he is named in the senior squad. "Parallel preparation" sounds symmetrical; on paper it is not. The U23 roster is the more fragile of the two.
Second consequence. The U23s are led by a different coach, "as in previous training camps" - an established arrangement, not a new appointment. If the U23 side plays a different system from the senior team, then the Pleiku tournament evaluates players individually but does not integrate them collectively. The pipeline leaks precisely at the handover point. Between two whistles there is a world the scoreboard cannot measure - and here, that world is the gap between two training camps without a shared curriculum.
Third, the age question. Players born 2026-2026 are the only group theoretically eligible for both squads in the same window. Every such player placed at Pleiku is one unavailable in Ninh Binh, and vice versa. The VFF states its priority plainly: pick the best players for the Asian Cup. Which means the U23 side is, structurally, a reserve and audition squad rather than a priority squad. There is nothing wrong with that as governance. But it should be called by its name, because the name determines how it gets judged.

Fourth, opponent design. Thailand on the 10th, Singapore on the 12th, Qatar on the 14th. A difficulty curve of high-low-high, with the two hardest matches at the extremes. For a young squad this is the most demanding possible configuration across five days: the opener against the fiercest rival before the legs are warm, and the finale against the strongest West Asian opponent when the legs are heaviest. Deliberate or not, it is a real test of endurance and squad depth.
Fifth, information loss. Ninh Binh and Pleiku sit more than a thousand kilometres apart by road, with overlapping schedules. Kim Sang Sik will almost certainly not watch the U23 matches live. His evaluation of young players will arrive second-hand, through the U23 staff's reports, through video, through someone else's description. The man who selects the senior squad will be judging the senior team's future through other people's eyes. I once sat through nine home matches at Long An and found three goals conceded in the final ten minutes, purely because I was there and saw what the camera never recorded. If you are not present, that is the part you lose.
On governance, the VFF holds an advantage most European federations lack: one body oversees both the national teams and the professional league. Club-versus-country conflict is therefore managed internally rather than through formal release rules. But that advantage only holds while cooperation is voluntary. And the person carrying the greatest uncertainty in this entire structure is the one who was never named: the U23 coach, whose success will be credited upward and whose failure will land on him. I do not keep the rhythm for the team; I keep the rhythm for the people who kept the rhythm for the team.
Here I want to go against the crowd. Public debate worries about which side is weaker, who was "cut" from the senior squad, whether the VFF has spread itself too thin. But the bigger risk is not a weak team. The bigger risk is a strong U23 team - winning the VTV Cup, collecting USD 100,000, and manufacturing a false success story about youth development.
Three matches in five days with a USD 100,000 prize is a good environment for short-term results and a poor environment for patient development. A U23 coach has a genuine incentive to pick the strongest players available to win matches, not necessarily the cohort the 2028 qualifiers require. If the U23s win, the media will read it as proof of a pipeline that works. But the pipeline is still unconnected: the U23 coach is not the senior coach, the playing system may differ, and nobody has published the selection criteria. A trophy in Pleiku could conceal precisely the gap it is supposed to be filling.
One more detail worth noting: the scare quotes around "chia quân" in the press headlines. It is a military metaphor - the dispersion of force - not neutral administrative language. Editors use scare quotes to say: this is the federation's framing, we are reporting it, not endorsing it. The media had already identified the dilution angle before any squad list appeared. The story is one news cycle away from inversion: from "calm management" to "divided focus."
So what to watch in the next two weeks? Not the results. The Ninh Binh friendlies and the three Pleiku matches will be forgotten quickly. Watch how the two lists are published. Published together, with allocation criteria attached, means a real plan. Published apart, or with a late and thin U23 list, means club cooperation is not secured the way the communiqué implies. And watch the name of the U23 coach. If it is a senior-team assistant, the pipeline can connect. If it is an independent appointment, the discontinuity is real. Correcting a wrong name takes 47 days; keeping a person's trust takes a lifetime. And football never owes us a result, it only owes us a story. The story of this November will be written not on the scoreboard at Pleiku, but at the point where two squad lists meet - or fail to.
