Penn State exits Power 10 after Tennessee loss: Three layers of data and the 'unforced errors' trap
The third week of the NCAA Division I women's volleyball season just closed...
The third week of the NCAA Division I women's volleyball season just closed with a shake-up no one following the rankings could ignore: Penn State, ranked No. 9 in NCAA.com's Power 10, lost 1-3 to Tennessee on September 21. Immediately after the defeat, the Penn State volleyball program's own website chose an apparently professional phrase to explain it: "unforced errors" — self-inflicted mistakes, not forced by the opponent. But if you read the entire release and the published numbers carefully, you will notice something that made me — a man who has followed thousands of sporting contests from both the stands and the spreadsheets — stop: not a single error figure was published. No set scores. No Tennessee statistics. In other words, this release accused "unforced errors" of being the culprit while offering no quantitative evidence for the conviction. It was a strange case — and for me, that is precisely where the real story begins.
Before going deeper, I need to set the context. The Power 10 is an editorial ranking published by NCAA.com and curated by analyst Michella Chester, updated weekly during the season. In Week 3, two new teams entered the top 10: TCU and Tennessee. Penn State — a team that had appeared in the Power 10 since the start of the season — was pushed out for the first time this year. This is the first time this season the Nittany Lions have been absent from the list, and it is also their first defeat against a ranked opponent. On the calendar, this is the non-conference window — the stretch of matches outside conference play where teams bank victories to build their NCAA Tournament resume. Tennessee was described as a team "building its resume" — and the win over Penn State was the turning point that placed them in the "top tier of college women's volleyball." But it must be stressed from the start: the Power 10 is not an official selection mechanism. It does not decide entry into the 64-team field. It does not decide seeding. That role belongs to the RPI — the Rating Percentage Index — and the NCAA selection committee. Penn State leaving the Power 10, therefore, is first and foremost a perception event, a media recalibration — not a competitive event with decisive consequences for the season.
Now I want to reach the core — where the data, however thin, still speaks louder than headlines. First is the first layer of data: the numbers that were published. In the 1-3 loss to Tennessee, Penn State had three players explicitly named. Gabrielle Nichols, the setter, recorded 38 assists and 12 digs for a double-double — the third time this season she has reached that milestone. Ava Falduto led the team with 15 digs. Ryla Jones, the outside hitter, was named in the lineup but had no statistical line attached. Was this omission deliberate or accidental? I cannot say for certain, but in more than three decades of following sports, I have never seen a match release accidentally forget the stats of a named outside hitter. Every stadium has two stories: one of the crowd, one of those who know how to read the rhythm. Here, the story of the numbers reveals a carefully curated picture: highlighting individuals who performed well in defeat while avoiding any aggregate figures that could expose the true scale of the loss.
Let me analyze Nichols's numbers further. In a four-set match — a 1-3 scoreline — her 38 assists mean an average of 9.5 assists per set. A college volleyball set typically runs to 25 points, and a setter may touch the ball 50 to 80 times per set depending on the system. 9.5 assists per set is not an especially high number, but it sits within the range suggesting the offensive system was still functioning — nominally. What is more striking is Nichols's 12 digs, second on the team behind Falduto's 15. In college volleyball, when a setter must make 12 digs in a single match, I begin to question the defensive structure. There are two possibilities. One: Penn State's defense was absorbing many hard attacks that deflected far from the setter's position. Two: the setter was being pulled into a defensive-back role within zone defense schemes — a stopgap solution commonly seen in teams whose block cannot keep up with the opponent. Without full team totals, I cannot determine which case applies. But based on my experience following matches, setters with unusually high dig numbers in a loss are often a signal of a transition breakdown — meaning the reception was unstable, the ball bounced away from the planned zone, and the setter had to move more to save it. The result is that the offense becomes slow and predictable, and the opponent has time to set a more precise block. This, combined with Falduto's 15 digs — a high number suggesting Tennessee was not afraid to attack hard and Penn State had to defend a great deal — paints the picture of a team that defended well but was inefficient at converting defensive opportunities into sharp attacking chances. I call this phenomenon "transitional stagnation syndrome": you save the ball, you keep the rally alive, but you cannot do anything with it. The setter runs everywhere to save balls, the attack slows down, and the opponent rebuilds its block. The result: a loss where the individual stats still look "not bad" — but the overall scoreline makes it clear the team lost control of the tempo.
This is where I want to borrow a lesson from track and field — because I have never limited myself to one sport. In 2026, I turned down an invitation to cover the football World Cup in Russia to fly to the Asian Games in Jakarta, where I followed a Filipino 400m hurdler running 51.20 seconds in the qualifying rounds. Everyone saw it as ordinary. I spent three days breaking down slow-motion footage and found that he was clipping the trail leg at hurdles 7 and 9 — each clip costing about two-tenths of a second. We fixed the technique, and he won a bronze medal in 49.87 seconds. The lesson I took from that experience is this: before accepting any diagnosis — whether "hurdle clipping" or "unforced errors" — the analyst must locate the exact point of failure. A general diagnosis is only a starting point, never a conclusion. In Penn State's case, for the "unforced errors" label to have real diagnostic value, it had to be broken down into specific error types: how many service errors, how many attack errors, how many reception errors? Each type belongs to a different operating system. Service errors relate to risk management and psychological pressure. Attack errors relate to shot selection and set quality. Reception errors relate to the ability to read the opponent's serve. But the Penn State release — and Volleyballmag.com's article added nothing on this front — stopped at a single label. This is the biggest weakness in the entire data structure surrounding the match: a conclusion was reached with no disaggregated data to support it.
That brings me to the second layer of data — and perhaps the most valuable layer: what was not published. Let me list the gaps. First, there are no set scores. A 1-3 loss could have been 23-25, 25-27, 21-25 — an extremely tight match decided by crucial points — or it could have been 12-25, 15-25, 18-25 — a completely one-sided contest. These two scenarios lead to completely different conclusions about Tennessee's true standing. If Tennessee won three close sets, they deserve to be mentioned in the top tier, because they beat a strong team in decisive moments. If they won three lopsided sets, the "resume-building" story carries much more weight. But we are not told. Second, there are no specific error statistics. The term "unforced errors" appears in the Penn State release as a diagnosis, but there is no detailed error ledger — no service errors, no attack errors, no reception errors. In modern volleyball, where statistical platforms track every rally, publishing a match release without error data is a deliberate editorial choice. Failing to publish error data, when tracking technology is readily available, is itself a message. Third, Tennessee's entire statistical output is absent. Tennessee — the winning team, the protagonist of the "top tier" story — is completely invisible in the statistical picture the sources provide. How many blocks did they record? How many aces? What was their attack efficiency? All blank. For a journalist, the complete absence of the winning team's data is a red flag. It turns an article about a match — which by definition involves two teams — into an article about only the loser, and, more than that, only about what the loser wants the public to see.
Here I must address a phenomenon I have observed many times in my career: the selective disclosure of statistics in college athletics releases after a loss. When a highly ranked team loses to a lower-ranked opponent, the school's athletics communications department typically has three options. The first: publish all the numbers and face the truth — which may trigger waves of criticism from local fans and media. The second: remain silent — which creates an information vacuum that journalists will fill with speculation. The third — and this is the most common — publish selectively, highlight individuals who performed well, emphasize a non-systemic factor like "unforced errors," and hope the story shifts away from the hard question: is this team really as good as its ranking? I have seen this in football, in basketball, in volleyball, and in track and field — where national federations often hide detailed technical parameters after major failures. But American college sports have a feature few other places possess: a public data system. In many cases, NCAA data platforms still archive the full box score. Fans can look it up. That is precisely why when a release chooses to withhold information — while the raw data is available elsewhere — it reveals intentional curation rather than accidental omission. I am not saying Penn State is deliberately deceiving the public. I am simply noting a fact: in a match where the entire media narrative revolves around the concept of "errors," failing to publish the specific error count is an omission that cannot be justified on technical grounds.
Now let me discuss the third layer of data — the systemic layer, where I want to offer my own analytical hypothesis. When a No. 9 team loses to a No. 16 team by a 1-3 scoreline, several tactical possibilities must be considered. First: Penn State was completely outmatched tactically — Tennessee served precisely, organized blocks well, and attacked more efficiently in every aspect. Second: Penn State beat themselves — individual mistakes accumulated into points for the opponent. Third: a combination of both. Based on the only data we have — Nichols's 38 assists and 12 digs, Falduto's 15 digs — I lean toward the third possibility, with greater weight on the transition factor. As I analyzed, Penn State's lineup had two players with high dig totals, proving they had to defend a huge volume of work. In volleyball, high defensive volume usually means long rallies — because the ball is not being put away quickly. A good defensive team is one that extends rallies; but in a loss, that reflects a paradox: a team that defends well yet cannot convert defensive situations into attacking points. This is the reason I question Penn State's transitional attacking efficiency — an aspect no source in this week's story has addressed.
I also want to place Nichols's third double-double of the season in proper context. This is a positive indicator, undeniable. Nichols shows the stability of a two-way contributor — she distributes well while also defending effectively. But I view this through a risk lens: when a setter becomes the leading defensive presence — second on the team in digs behind Falduto — that team is showing signs of over-reliance on the setter in every area. Penn State risks becoming a one-player team, with its fulcrum resting solely on the setter position. This is acceptable in the short term, but across a long season, with the demanding Big Ten schedule — one of the strongest conferences in women's college volleyball — placing the entire operation on one setter's shoulders is a significant gamble. If Nichols gets injured or is neutralized by opponents serving at her, Penn State may have no proven alternative — because we do not even know whether they have a reliable backup setter, since the source never mentions any reserve option.
Another point in the systemic layer: the data gaps in this match — no set scores, no error counts — make it impossible for me to determine the true magnitude of the upset. If Penn State lost three very close sets, the Week 3 story is about an unlucky team — a minor perception correction. If they lost three sets by wide margins, the story is about a team that was outclassed — a worrying sign for Nittany Lions fans. I cannot distinguish these two scenarios from the available sources, and that is an important analytical limitation I want to state plainly to readers, rather than pretending I know something the data does not allow. That honesty about limitations — perhaps a trait I learned from analyzing the 400m hurdles — is what separates an analyst from a guesser. I do not guess. I calculate. And when I do not have enough data to calculate, I say so clearly.
Perhaps the most meaningful part of this week's data structure is a parallel story: TCU also entered the top 10 in the same update. This tells me that the Week 3 shake-up was not merely about one result — Penn State losing to Tennessee — but a structural realignment happening across multiple teams simultaneously. The original article mentioned "additional movement" without detailing it. But the fact that two teams entered the top 10 at the same time shows that analysts were adjusting rankings systematically, not reacting to isolated events. In track and field terminology, I call this a top-field shift: when two or three athletes break personal records in the same season, it is rarely a matter of individual luck — it is usually a sign of systemic change: better training conditions, new tactics, or a new generation of athletes with superior physical capacity. In college volleyball, the simultaneous rise of TCU and Tennessee may signal the emergence of new-generation programs — programs investing in resources, coaching, and high school recruiting more effectively than traditional powers. Conversely, Penn State — a historic program possibly in transition — has just received a market warning signal.
And now the contrarian angle — the section I always reserve for challenging the mainstream story itself. The Week 3 mainstream narrative says: "Tennessee is rising, Penn State is falling, TCU is emerging — we are witnessing a hierarchy shake-up in American college women's volleyball." I believe this reading misses a crucial point: it merges two entirely different systems — editorial rankings and official selection mechanisms — into a single view. Let me be clear. The Power 10, as I said, is an editorial product of one writer. It carries the personal bias of its curator. It fluctuates weekly. A single result can push a team in or out simply because of the analyst's opinion — not because the team's actual value has changed. When readers treat the Power 10 as an official verdict, they commit a category error. Teams entering the NCAA Tournament — the 64-team field that determines the national champion — are not chosen by the Power 10. Seeds are not arranged by the Power 10. That authority belongs to the NCAA selection committee, which relies on RPI and other qualitative evaluations. So when Penn State "leaves the Power 10," it simply means analyst Michella Chester believes two other teams are playing better at the moment — it does not mean Penn State's chances of making the NCAA Tournament have diminished. The real story lies in the RPI, where this loss will still leave a mark — but a mark that can be erased by significant conference-play victories.
The irony is that the mainstream narrative itself — "Tennessee has just entered the top tier of college volleyball" — is a textbook example of single-data-point inflation, a condition I have seen repeat for 31 years of observing the industry. One win — even over a No. 9 team — is not enough to establish a team in the highest tier. College volleyball, like every sport, needs more than one data point to confirm a trend. A win over an opponent having an off day is not the same as beating a series of strong opponents consecutively. Tennessee will have to prove its "top tier" status against SEC opponents for the rest of the season. If they replicate that performance, I will be the first to acknowledge it. But Week 3, for me, remains a single bright spot — a beautiful sprint in the qualifying rounds, not yet a full season.
A second contrarian layer — and I think this is the deepest one — concerns the very concept of "unforced errors" in American college sports. This concept, borrowed from tennis, assumes a team can lose by self-destruction. But in modern volleyball, a purely "unforced error" rarely exists. A serve that appears to be a "self-inflicted error" may be the result of the opponent exploiting a psychological weakness — forcing the other team to change serving tactics, take higher risks, and consequently miss more. An attack hit out of bounds — seemingly a "self-inflicted error" — may result from the opponent's block obscuring vision and forcing the hitter to choose a difficult angle. In other words, when Penn State diagnosed its own defeat with just the phrase "unforced errors," they were — deliberately or not — denying Tennessee's ability to exert systematic pressure. Meanwhile, from the opponent's perspective, Tennessee did exactly what a resume-building team must do: they created a competitive environment in which Penn State — a team known for discipline — committed too many nameless errors. Penn State did not lose by self-destruction; Tennessee won through systematic pressure tactics. Calling it "unforced errors" is diplomatically polite but analytically inaccurate. At the highest level of sport, very few mistakes are truly unforced by the opponent.
I also want to address an aspect few analyses mention: the difference between an analyst's verdict — whether Michella Chester of NCAA.com or myself — and the market's verdict. In 31 years in this profession, I have learned one thing: media rankings have short life cycles. They are made to be consumed weekly, and they are forgotten the following week. But official selection mechanisms — RPI, head-to-head results, quality of wins, athlete health — have long memories. The 1-3 loss to Tennessee will still appear in Penn State's RPI profile when the selection committee meets in December. It will not be forgotten like a weekly ranking. So the proper question is not "Does Penn State deserve to leave the Power 10 top 10?" but "How will this loss affect Penn State's RPI in the race for the NCAA Tournament?" And the answer, of course, depends on what they do next. A Week 3 loss — in the non-conference window — still leaves a scar on the RPI, but a small scar, one that can heal with significant Big Ten victories — where the season still offers many opportunities to rebuild a resume.
But what if I am wrong? Let me argue against myself once more, as I always do before finalizing any analysis. There is a scenario in which my entire reading is redundant. That scenario says: Tennessee really is a stronger team than I thought, and Penn State truly is in decline — not just perception-wise, but in player quality and roster depth. I cannot completely rule out this scenario, because my data source has a serious gap: I have no season performance data for Tennessee. I do not know who they beat before Penn State, who they lost to, or by what scores. If Tennessee had an impressive run against other strong teams in the first two weeks — if the Penn State win was merely the peak of rising form — then my reading is wrong. Conversely, if Tennessee had only beaten weak teams before facing Penn State, then this victory carries even greater informational value. Because I lack this data, I will tell readers plainly: my analysis is provisional, based on what is publicly available, and must be revised when Tennessee's full box scores and match history are published. I do not write for those who watch the match. I write for those who want to understand why the match happened the way it did. And to understand that, I need every piece — including the pieces being hidden.
Let me offer one final observation on structure: the simultaneous entry of TCU and Tennessee, together with Penn State being pushed out, was used by the original article to funnel readers toward additional coverage of "further movement" — a typical funnel structure in sports media platforms designed to drive engagement. This is not wrong, but it should be understood as part of content economics: weekly rankings are designed to generate traffic, generate debate, and generate news cycles. The analyst ranks, the outlet reports, the readers discuss, and the following week — the cycle restarts with a new ranking. Seen this way, the Week 3 "shake-up" is a design feature of the American college sports media system, not an anomaly in competitive quality. If a sports physicist observed this system, they might describe it as a harmonic oscillation: oscillating around a mean value, with wide amplitude early in the season that narrows as the season lengthens. What I care about — as an analyst — is that mean value. And that mean value only emerges when the sequence of matches is long enough: when Penn State, Tennessee, TCU — and all the other teams — enter conference play and face peers in a distance race.
That brings me to the conclusion. Week 3 of the NCAA women's volleyball season is not a final verdict. It is a snapshot — a moment in a long race where the sprinters of the first 100 meters have temporarily taken the lead, but the real race begins in the remaining kilometers. I have learned from the 400m hurdles that the opening moment of a race rarely decides the final outcome. What matters is the rhythm over each hurdle, the endurance in the final 100 meters, and the ability to avoid mistakes — clipping hurdles, losing rhythm — when opponents begin to close in. Penn State just clipped a hurdle in Week 3. They lost a little time, but they still have an entire track ahead. Tennessee just cleared a hurdle well — but there are many hurdles remaining. The biggest question this week is not who entered the top 10 or who left it. The biggest question is: who can hold the pace when the season enters its most difficult turns — conference play, selection weekend, and the NCAA Tournament in December? My data system survived the sports winter, and now it is pointing the way toward spring. But the lesson I want to leave here, having dissected each layer of data, is this: do not rush to write Penn State's obituary, and do not rush to crown Tennessee. Let the season speak for itself. And remember — every stadium has two stories: one of the crowd, one of those who know how to read the rhythm. The crowd has chosen the Week 3 story. I am waiting for the December story.
