Esports is not dying, it's being reallocated: Lessons from TI, EWC and Dplus KIA's crisis

A team that won a world championship, yet still delayed its players' salaries. Another team that just lifted the The International trophy, then announced its withdrawal from Dota 2 shortly after. If you are a Vietnamese esports fan, you have likely heard the story of the 'esports winter' – but the truth is far more complex. When Dplus KIA – the League of Legends champion at the Esports World Cup (EWC) 2026 – had to seek a new owner due to cash flow depletion, and Team Falcons – the team that just dominated The International (TI) 2026 – decided to no longer invest in Dota 2, the full picture becomes clear: money still exists, but it no longer flows easily through the entire system. Look at the TI prize pool figures. In 2026, the largest Dota 2 tournament pool reached $40 million thanks to the crowdfunding mechanism from the Battle Pass. In 2026, it dropped to $18.9 million. By 2026, it was only about $3.4 million. Most recently, the prize pool was in the low millions – a decline of over 90% from the peak. The direct cause: Valve changed the Battle Pass model, severing the link between in-game item revenue and tournament prize money. But don't rush to conclude that Dota 2 is dying. The prize pool decline is not evidence of declining community interest – it is merely the arithmetic consequence of removing crowdfunding. What's more important: a publisher product decision (Valve) collapsed a funding channel worth tens of millions of dollars, and there is no safeguard mechanism from the competitive ecosystem. Meanwhile, another source of money is rising. The Esports World Cup 2026, backed by Saudi Arabia, announced a total prize pool of $75 million spanning dozens of titles. The Saudi eLeague 2026 also invested over 4 million SAR with 37 participating clubs. This is a state-backed capital concentration, redirecting money into a few mega-events instead of spreading it year-round. In contrast to that massive capital flow, traditional esports organizations are showing signs of exhaustion. Dplus KIA is a prime example: their League of Legends roster costs about 3 billion won (approximately $2 million) annually in salaries, and despite winning EWC 2026, they still cannot balance their books. The search for a new owner is not because they are underperforming competitively – it is because their cost structure exceeds their revenue generation capacity. Team Falcons tells the opposite story. They won TI 2026, entered 18 tournaments within the EWC 2026 framework – yet still decided to withdraw from Dota 2. The official reason: they want to focus on titles with higher commercial potential and long-term strategy. In essence, this is a portfolio optimization decision: Falcons retain many other titles, but Dota 2 no longer fits their profitability priorities. Both cases prove a paradox: winning does not guarantee survival. In today's esports, a champion team can still go bankrupt if its roster costs exceed the commercial value it generates. This is a costly lesson for any organization, especially for Vietnamese teams dreaming of making it on the international stage. In response to this reality, the Korean League of Legends Championship (LCK) has acted. They imposed a salary cap with a luxury tax to control costs and rebalance competition. This is a proactive governance intervention – not to punish wealthy teams, but to prevent the endless salary race from pushing the entire league into risk. But is a salary cap enough? Looking at the development cycle of esports, it is clear that player prices have risen faster than revenue generation during the boom phase. As a result, many teams signed high-salary contracts based on expectations of infinite growth – but when growth stalled, the financial burden crushed them. Dplus KIA is a living example: a roster worth millions of dollars but lacking commensurate commercial value becomes a burden instead of an asset. So what is the way out? The original article – on which this analysis is based – points to a core thesis: 'Money still exists, but it no longer flows easily through the entire system.' Instead, capital is concentrating on major tournaments, commercially viable titles, and organizations with sustainable operating models. In other words, this is not the collapse of esports, but a reallocation. What does this mean for Vietnamese fans? First, don't rush to believe the 'esports is dying' narratives. Second, Vietnamese teams should learn from Dplus KIA and Falcons: diversify investment portfolios, control salary costs, and build brands with sustainable commercial value instead of relying solely on tournament prize money. Finally, the rise of state-backed tournaments like EWC opens opportunities but also creates dependency risks – like putting all eggs in one basket. If you are an investor or esports professional in Vietnam, look at the bigger picture: the decline in TI prize money is not a death knell; the expansion of EWC and Saudi eLeague is not the only certain future. What truly matters is understanding the flow of value – and betting on models that can survive the ups and downs. In conclusion: Esports is not dying, it is being reallocated. The only question is – are you ready to adapt?